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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court improperly dismissed the petition for post conviction relief as 
untimely, as the petitioner has demonstrated that such relief is warranted under the 
"interests of justice" statutory exception. Petitioner's claims are meritorious and should 
be considered and granted. 
Point II: Petitioner's request for post conviction relief should have been granted on the 
basis that her constitutional rights were violated. The Appellant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and the trial court erred in accepting her plea, which was 
involuntarily and unknowing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS UNTIMELY 
A. The statutory limitations period is inapplicable to the present case, thus 
Appellant's petition should not have been dismissed as time barred. 
The trial court erred in dismissing the appellant's petition for post-conviction 
relief of grounds of timeliness. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "the mere passage 
of time can never justify continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of 
fundamental rights, regardless of how difficult it may be for the State to reprosecute that 
individual." Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) (emphasis in original). 
The Post Conviction Remedies Act provides for a defendant to petition for post-
conviction relief, such as a vacation or modification of an original conviction on grounds 
that "the conviction was obtained . . . in violation of the United States Constitution . . 
.[or] the Utah Constitution . . . [or] the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution^]" Utah Code Ann. §78-
3 5a-104. The purpose of this act is to provide a "substantive legal remedy for any 
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has 
exhausted all other legal remedies[.]" U.C.A. §78-35a-102. Review of a final conviction 
is generally not subject to attack, except in unusual circumstances. Jackson v. Friel 2004 
UT App 155 (citing Carter v. Galetka, 2001 Ut 96, f 15, 44 P.3d 626). A demonstration 
of unusual circumstances may be made by showing that "there was an obvious injustice 
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right." Id. 
The statute governing post conviction relief provides that such a petition must be 
filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued. U.C.A. §78-35a-107(l). 
However, this same statute specifically provides that "[i]f the court finds that the interests 
of justice so require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time 
limitations. U.C.A. §78-35a-107(3). The Utah Supreme Court has recently clarified the 
meaning of "interests of justice" within the context of this act, applying its conclusion in 
similar cases that "trial courts must always consider the 'interests of justice' exception . . 
when a petitioner raises meritorious claims." State v. Adams, 2005 UT 62, f 15 (Utah 
2005) (citing Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998) and its application of "interests 
of justice" exception articulated in Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 253-54 (Utah 1998)). 
(internal quotations omitted). 
The "interests of justice" exception in Utah Code Ann. §78-3 5a-107(3) allows for 
a trial court to grant post-conviction relief beyond the one-year statute of limitations in 
cases where it is justified, as in the present case. The trial court's dismissal of 
Appellant's petition on grounds of timeliness was premature, as the facts in this case 
bring it within the specified exception. 
B. Appellant's claim meets the statutory "interests of justice" exception. 
The Appellant concedes that her petition was filed beyond the one-year statute of 
limitations period provided in Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-107(a)-(b). However, rather than 
giving rise to a mandatory dismissal of a petition, an untimely request under this statute 
requires the trial court to analyze whether the petition should still be heard and granted 
under the statutory exception to the limitations period proscribed in U.C.A. §78-35a-
107(c). The instant petition falls squarely within the "interests of justice" grounds, 
which specifically justifies the acceptance of a petition filed beyond the one-year period. 
Petitioner has alleged in detail both constitutional violations and the ineffective 
assistance of counsel as grounds for justifying excusing the time limitation in her initial 
brief, and will address the challenges proffered by the State at this time. The State relies 
upon a recent opinion issued by the Utah Supreme Court, Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62 
(September 23, 2005), in support of the trial court's dismissal of the petition. The state 
cites the following excerpt of the opinion as dispositive: "[I]n determining whether the 
"interests of justice" exception applies, [a] court must consider whether (1) the petition 
raises potentially meritorious claims and (2) the reason for the untimely filing." Adams v. 
State, 2005 UT 621fl6. R.Aplt. Br. at 11. (emphasis added). 
In the same paragraph and in the sentence immediately following that cited above 
by the State in support of their contention, the supreme court states: 
"We do not establish a hard and fast rule that a petitioner must be able to 
demonstrate both that his claim is meritorious and that he was justified in raising 
it late; rather, we expect that the district court will give appropriate weight to each 
of those factors according to the circumstances of a particular case." Adams at 
116. 
In Adams, the petitioner was convicted of forcible sexual abuse; both this Court 
and the Utah Supreme Court then affirmed this conviction on direct appeal. See State v. 
Adams, 2000 UT 42, f23, 5 P.2d 642 and State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781, 788 (Utah App. 
1998). The statute of limitations for post conviction relief expired for Adams on August 
3, 2001. Id. at f l2. Adams filed his petition nearly two years after the limitations period 
had expired, on May 14, 2003, on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel - the trial 
court granted the state's motion to dismiss the petition on grounds of timeliness. Id. at | 4 . 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that Adams' petition should not have 
been dismissed as it presented a potentially meritorious claim, and he had good reason for 
filing beyond the statute of limitations. Id. at f27. The court found that Adams' claim 
that his prior attorneys were ineffective for a failing to raise voluntary intoxication as a 
defense was potentially meritorious due to the specific intent requirement for the offense 
of forcible sexual abuse. Id. at [^22 and n.3. In addition, the court found that Adams' 
reason for untimely filing was justified, as he wasn't aware of the possibility of a 
voluntary intoxication defense until after locating counsel1. Id. at f 23. 
The Adams decision is substantially analogous to and controlling in the present 
case. Under the standard established by Adams, the Appellant meets the "interests of 
justice" exception. The Appellant has proffered two potentially meritorious claims, each 
of which would independently warrant relief under the statute. First, petitioner has 
presented and supported by affidavit the fact that she was under the influence of multiple 
prescription medications at the time of her plea, which substantially impacted her 
1
 Adams discharged his trial counsel and hired new counsel prior to pursuing his direct appeals, and then 
sought the services of a third attorney who finally brought the intoxication defense to his attention. 
cognitive functioning to a heightened degree, and that the plea was thereby offered 
unknowingly and involuntarily. In addition, petitioner asserts a meritorious ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim - each of these claims will be treated in further detail below. 
In Adams, the failure of both trial counsel and counsel for the direct appeals to 
raise a possible affirmative defense was viewed as a potentially meritorious claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel; here, after being informed by the Appellant of her 
desire to appeal, Ms. BluemePs counsel not only did not file the notice to appeal, but he 
misrepresented the time for a required appeal, misrepresented that the appeal was being 
taken care of, and mismanaged the submission of the plea by being unaware of his 
client's condition and intake of prescription medication. 
With respect to the reason for the untimely petition, in Adams, the court found 
that the unawareness of a possible defense justified filing nearly two years beyond the 
deadline. In the present case, the State gives the erroneous indication that the Appellant 
filed her petition two years late. Rspndt. Br. at 13. This overstates the untimeliness of the 
petition. The first year that transpired following her sentencing, the proscribed period for 
a post-conviction relief petition, the Appellant understood that her trial counsel was 
handling the appeal, as he had told her he was handling the appeal and that there was one 
year in which to do so, she had no knowledge to the contrary. When the Appellant 
realized she was no longer receiving assistance with her appeal, the one-year statue of 
limitations had already expired. Appellant then sought and ultimately secured new 
counsel, all the while incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. With the expected degree of 
difficulty, appellant was ultimately able to secure counsel, who then assessed the case, 
researched the applicable law and filed the petition within one year and seven days of the 
limitations period, a reasonable time period under the circumstances, and nearly half that 
of the appellant in Adams. 
Appellant is similarly situated to Adams, in that neither understood the legal 
significance of their situations. In analyzing these circumstances, the Utah Supreme 
Court relied upon the language of Justice Zimmerman offered in Julian, that "it is nearly 
impossible for even the most conscientious prisoner to discover possibly valid legal 
claims of error and pursue them completely." Julian, 966 P.2d at 259. (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring). Justice Zimmerman further commented that "the legal services provided to 
assist the prisoners are grossly inadequate. Under such circumstances, it is a cruel joke to 
presume as the legislature has that virtually all prisoners are abusing the system when 
they file . . . petitions more than a year after their conviction." Id. The Adams court 
"decline[d] to put the burden on individuals untrained in the law to discover the errors of 
those whose assistance they were constitutionally guaranteed." Adams at f 23. It is 
clearly unjust to punish the Appellant for the misrepresentations of her prior counsel, and 
for the difficulty she had in procuring new counsel from the state prison. Just as the 
supreme court found in Adams, this court should find that the Appellant's claims meet the 
"interests of justice" exception. 
The trial court erred in dismissing the Appellant's petition as time-barred, as the 
petition falls squarely within the "interests of justice" exception provided by statute. 
Relief should be granted because the Appellant presented potentially meritorious claims 
of (1) ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) involuntary and unknowing pleas; and 
presented a reasonable, acceptable and justified reason for the delay in her petition which 
has recently been recognized by the supreme court of this state. 
II. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF BASED ON THE MERITS 
OF HER PETITION, 
A. Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to have assistance of counsel in 
defending all claims asserted against them in a court of law, a guarantee provided for by 
both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Utah State 
Constitution. This fundamental right has been appropriately termed "the right to effective 
assistance of counsel" by the Supreme Court. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
n.14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n.14, L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). The Utah Supreme Court has 
interpreted this guarantee as entitling a defendant to "assistance of a competent member 
of the Bar, who shows a willingness to identify himself with the interests of the accused 
and present such defenses as are available under the law and consistent with the ethics of 
the profession." State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976). 
The right to effective counsel is an essential safeguard, and the courts in this state 
have recognized that there is no replacement for a competent and dedicated advocate. See 
State v. Adams, 2005 UT 62 at f 24 (noting the importance of competent counsel, and 
stating that even though the client is the ultimate decision maker, counsel is required to 
"at least apprise the client of the options available and give advice based on research, 
experience, and sound judgment."). Constitutional standards specify that counsel is 
ineffective if their "performance both falls below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and prejudices the client." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, in order to establish that counsel was ineffective, it must be 
shown that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," 
a standard generally determined by examining the prevailing professional norms. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In addition, the defendant must show that they were 
prejudiced by the deficient performance of their counsel." Id. at 689. 
In order to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below reasonable 
standards, a defendant must identify "specific acts or omissions demonstrating that 
counsel's representation failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness." Moench 
v. State, 2004 UT App 57, 88 P.3d 353 (citing Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 
(Utah 1995)). Counsel's tactical decisions are generally granted wide latitude, and only 
questioned if unreasonable. See Moench, 2004 UT App at 121. However, lawyers are 
bound to abide by a client's decisions regarding the objectives of the representation. See 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a). In addition to identifying an attorney's role 
and the scope of representation, the Utah Rules of Professional conduct also require an 
attorney to "act with reasonable diligence and promptness," to "keep their clients 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter" and to "explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation." See Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3-1.4. 
While the Rules of Professional conduct speak generally about the duties owed to 
clients, numerous courts have spoken regarding the specific issue presented in this case, 
whether disregarding instructions to appeal qualifies as ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The Supreme Court has held that "a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the 
defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable." 
Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S.Ct. 1715, 23 L.Ed.2d 340 (1969); Mancil 
v. State, 682 So.2d 501, 502 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996) (holding that "[fjailure to timely appeal 
to this court is a classic example of ineffective assistance of counsel."); Henderson v. 
State, 643 S.W. 2d 107, 108-09 (Ark. 1982) (holding that "the failure of counsel to 
perfect an appeal in a criminal case where the defendant desires an appeal amounts to a 
denial of the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel."); State v. Wicker, 20 
P.2d 1007 (Wash.App. 2001) ("it is well-recognized that an attorney's failure to file a 
requested notice of appeal is 'professionally unreasonable.'"). 
Where a defendant has been denied the right to appeal, they have been denied a 
constitutional right warranting post-conviction relief. See Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 
42-43 (Utah 1981). Utah courts have held that if "within the statutory period for appeal, 
[the] defendant requested counsel to take an appeal and counsel gave defendant reason to 
believe that he would but then failed to do so, defendant was denied a constitutional right. 
See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). In Johnson, because the defendant 
was effectively denied his constitutional right to appeal, post conviction relief was 
deemed the appropriate remedy. Id. 
Here, the Appellant requested her counsel to file an appeal, and was repeatedly 
assured that trial counsel had done so, and was 'handling it.' (Civil R. 113). Trial counsel 
even visited Appellant in prison where she again expressed her desire to appeal, and was 
yet again reassured by counsel that it was being taken care of. Id. By the time Appellant 
discovered that she had been mislead, and that trial counsel hadn't filed her appeal, not 
only had the time for an appeal lapsed, but the time period for filing a petition seeking 
post-conviction relief had passed as well. The legal counsel provided to the Appellant 
following her sentencing was not only clearly ineffective, it was essentially non-existent. 
Trial counsel blatantly ignored Appellant's specific requests, and mislead her with 
respect to actions presumably taken and misstated the applicable law. {See Aplt. Br. at 
40-46 for specific examples of counsel's inefficiency and failure to serve Appellant's 
objectives). 
In addition to falling below standards of professional reasonableness, counsel's 
deficient performance significantly prejudiced the Appellant. Prejudice can be presumed 
to exist when counsel fails to file an appeal after being requested to do so, and need not 
be demonstrated by the defendant. See Broeckel v. State, 900 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1995). 
Here, prejudice can be shown by the failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Roe 
v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). Appellant can 
satisfy both elements as required under Strickland, on this basis alone. In addition to this 
failure, Appellant has presented additional prejudices in the form of failure to file 
additional motions, as well as failure to assess her ability to enter into a knowing and 
voluntary plea which further exacerbate the ineffective assistance of counsel received by 
the Appellant. (See Aplt. Br. at 44-46 for further details regarding counsel's deficiencies). 
B. Appellant's plea was involuntary and unknowing - as such the untimely 
tiling of her petition should be excused and post-conviction relief granted. 
A defendant appropriately petitions for post-conviction relief by challenging a 
conviction on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the United States or Utah 
2
 The State contends that Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to 
pursue an appeal was not preserved and is thus barred. (Rspndt. Br. at 22). The appropriate time to raise 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is upon appeal. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f 21 n. 2, 61 
P.3d 1062 (Utah 2002) (recognizing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as one of three instances 
under Utah law where an appellate court may address an issue for the first time on appeal). In fact, 
according to the Utah Supreme Court, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel "should be raised on 
appeal if (1) the record is adequate to permit decision of the issue and (2) defendant is represented by 
counsel other than trial counsel. State v. Lithander, 2000 UT 76, \ 9, 12 P.3d 92 (Utah 2000). Appellant's 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were thus appropriately raised. 
Constitutions. Utah Code Ann. §75-35a-104. The Constitution requires that any guilty 
plea be entered both voluntarily and knowingly. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,111, 
983 P.2d 556; State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When a plea 
is not voluntarily and knowingly entered, the defendant's due process rights have been 
violated, and the plea is accordingly deemed unconstitutional. Id; McCarthy v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). 
Prior to accepting a guilty plea from a defendant, a court must determine the 
following: that the plea was voluntary, the defendant is aware of the right to the 
presumption of innocence, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; that the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that if a trial occurred the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements, that there is a factual basis for the plea, 
that the defendant knows the minimum and maximum possible sentences, the details of 
the plea agreement, that the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing a 
motion to withdraw the plea, and that the defendant knows the right of appeal is limited. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). The court must be personally satisfied that each of the above 
elements is satisfied. Rule 11 must be strictly complied with, and the trial court has the 
burden to "personally establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or 
her constitutional rights." State v. Cornell, 2005 UT 28,111. See also State v. Ostler, 
2000 UT App 28,111, 996 P.2d 1065 (stating that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
is embodied in Rule 11); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1312 (Utah 
1987)(requirements in Rule 11 protect a defendant's right to due process). 
Appellant identified with specificity in her initial brief that Rule 11 was not 
strictly complied with in the present case. See Aplt. Br. at 23-24. In addition to the 
court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11, Appellant has also shown that her plea 
was in fact not knowing or voluntary. Salazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 
988 (Utah 1993). Under Utah law, for a plea to be knowing and voluntary, the defendant 
must be mentally competent. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, If 48, 63 P.3d 731. "No 
person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried for a public offense." Utah Code 
Ann. §77-15-1 (West 2004). U.C.A. §77-15-2 defines a defendant's incompetence to 
proceed as an "inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged; or . . . his inability to 
consult with counsel and to participate in the proceedings against him with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding." Utah Code Ann. §77-15-2 (West 2004). To determine 
whether a defendant is competent to plead guilty, a trial court must consider whether the 
defendant has the ability to "consult with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him [or her]." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted)(citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 
(1993)). 
The State contends that there was nothing before the trial court here to raise a 
substantial question about the Appellant's competence to plead guilty. Rspndt. Br. at 16. 
This perceived absence of evidence of the Appellant's incompetence is directly related to 
the trial court's failure to strictly adhere to Rule 11. Had the trial court attempted to 
"personally establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived her 
constitutional rights," it would have been clear that the Appellant lacked competence to 
enter a voluntary and knowing plea. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at \ 11. 
The state next alleges that the petitioner's affidavits are ambiguous with respect to 
the drugs she had actually taken immediately prior to her change-of-plea hearing, and the 
impairment they could have caused. Rspndt. Br. at 17. The Supreme Court has noted that 
a defendant's competency to enter a valid plea can be detrimentally affected by 
medications, which can cause a defendant to be unable to enter a knowing and voluntary 
plea. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396 (1993). 
Both the affidavit of the Appellant, and that of Dr. Rollins make specific 
references to the dosages and frequency with which each medication listed by the 
Appellant was taken at the time her plea was offered. (Bluemel Aff. at % 5; Rollins Aff. 
at f 6). Dr. Rollins' took this dosage and frequency into consideration when making the 
assertion that "[t]he effect of these drugs, if taken together, on a person of Ms. Bluemel's 
stature would likely have impaired her cognitive function to a heightened degree." 
(Rollins Aff. at 111). Dr. Rollins identified five drugs specifically as affecting cognitive 
functioning before making his determination. (Rollins Aff. at 16). Neurontin, Effexor, 
Xanax, Trazadone, and Soma were all identified as drugs with an impact on cognitive 
functioning. Id. Dr. Rollins was aware of dosage amounts, and noted that the Ms. 
Bluemel was taking a daily dose of Xanax and Trazadone, two daily doses of Effexor, 
three daily doses of Neurontin, and four daily doses of Soma. (Rollins Aff. at f 6). The 
State's contention that any impact of these drugs may have worn off at the time of the 
hearing is unsubstantiated; conversely, Dr. Rollins as a Professor of Pharmacology and 
Toxicology was aware of Ms. BluemePs daily medication regimen, and possesses the 
medical expertise to render a conclusion which takes into consideration any lingering side 
effects and influence the specified amount of the respective medications would have on 
an individual of the Appellant's stature. The argument concerning Ibuprofen and 
Macrodantin as mere 'responses to maladies' is irrelevant, as these two drugs are not 
listed among those affecting cognitive functioning. 
The State refers to the trial court's lack of commentary with respect to 
Appellant's responses to questions and her general demeanor as evidence that she was 
competent. (Rspndt. Br. at 18). This argument is flawed, as the trial court's exchanges 
and interaction with the Appellant were limited to a few cursory "yes" and "no" 
responses to routine questions. In fact, the Appellant appeared distracted throughout the 
proceeding, and not focused on the judge as would be expected under the circumstances. 
(Civil R. 146). The record reflects little interaction that would lead to a reliable 
determination that Appellant was competent, a fact that could have been determined with 
strict adherence to Rule 11, or with simple inquiry beyond the routine "yes" and "no" 
questions upon which the trial court based its determination of competency. 
The State again argues that the Appellant's written Plea Statement is evidence of 
her competence. This notion is misguided and fundamentally flawed. A defendant 
incapable of entering a voluntary and knowing plea is not deemed competent by virtue of 
signing a statement to that effect. A signed statement is simply insufficient to establish 
Appellant's competence. State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(holding that an affidavit alone is insufficient to ensure that the defendant's constitutional 
rights are protected); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-14 (same; after reviewing affidavit, a 
court should then question the defendant about it and determine whether the requirements 
are met). The Appellant's signed statement directly contradicts the subsequent affidavit 
which establishes that Appellant was under the influence of a number of medications 
which impacted her competence. A simple inquiry by the court on the record regarding 
the signed statement could have clarified the Appellant's condition and competency. 
However, the trial court accepted the statement at face value, and overlooked the 
requirements of Rule 11, thereby failing to sufficiently establish the competency of the 
Appellant, and her ability to offer a knowing and voluntary plea. Based upon the 
foregoing, this court should find that the plea offered by the Appellant was involuntary 
and unknowing, and as a result the trial court erred in accepting it. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth above, the Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial courts dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. 
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